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IN THE SUP'REME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PIIYLLIS K. S'Tl ... BER, 
Plaintiff and R-espondent) 
vs. 
/ 
IIAl~\rEY T. S-TUBER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
I 
APPELLANr_r'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. · ·· · 
7764 
On Ivlarch 29, 1945, the .respondent was granted .a 
Decree of Divorce from the appellant in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County. The resp·ondent was awarded 
the custody of Bruce Stuber, the minor child of plaintiff 
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and defendant, who at that time was 14 months of age. 
Respondent was granted $30.00 per month for the sup-
port of said child, together with alimony in th~ sum of 
$50.00 per month (T-1). 
On February 13, 1951, respondent filed her Affidavit 
setting up the terms of the Decree of Divorce, and alleg-
ing that respondent, due to her inability to properly 
care for said child, voluntarily placed the custody of 
said child with the appellant until such time as she 
could properly care for said child, and setting forth a 
claim for unpaid alimony in the amount of $3,550.00 (T-3). 
To the Affidavit thus filed, appellant made answer 
In substance and effect as follows: He admitted the 
award of $30.00 per month for the support of the minor 
child and. the sum of $50.00 per month alimony a.s set 
forth in the Decree. He admitted he had not paid the 
alimony and set forth that said minor child had been in 
his care, custody, and control, and that he had given to 
·said child its sole sup·port ever since the month of Feb-
ruary, 1946; denied that the child had been in the care, 
custody, and control of appellant's mother except a short 
time following the granting of. the Decree of Divorce; 
that he remarried on October 15, 1947, and that since 
that time said child had been in the care, custody, and 
control of ap·pellant and· ihis wife. For a period of 
approximately two years following February,. 1946, the 
respondent did not see said child and made no inquiries 
concerning said child, and that th.e mother took no sub-
stantial interest in said child until January 1950 and 
' ' 
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then visited said child on an average of once a n1onth. 
He alleged a.ffirn1atively that the respondent was not a 
proper person to have the care, custody, and control of 
said child; that said child had been cared for by ap·pel-
lant and his present "ife with the assistance of his 
mother, all of 'vho1n "\vere greatly interested in its wel-
fare, and that the conduct and behavior of the plaintiff 
''"·as not of such character as was or would be beneficial 
to said child if the care, custody, and control of said 
child was a\varded to the respondent. 
In Paragraph 4, appellant alleged that in the month 
of February, 1946, he had a conversation with respondent 
regarding said child, ~d at said time, respondent stated 
to appellant that she \Vanted appellant to take over the 
custody of said child and ussun1e the· obligation of its 
support, care, and Inaintena.nce; that if he would do so, 
respondent would n1ake no clain1 against appellant for 
any alimony or support n1Qney fo;r herself; the parties , 
then agreed that appellant would take over the care, 
custody, and control of said child and pay for same if the 
respondent \vould release to him any rights that she 
n1ight have to said child, and if she \vould further release 
any clain1 against appellant for alimony in the future. 
Appellant and respondent then and there agreed that for 
the foregoing considerations respondent would release 
nny elai1n that she 1night have against appellant for the 
future custody of said ehild and would n1ake no clai1n for , 
any alilnony in the future to \Vhich she might otherwi.se 
be entitled. Following said agreement, the appellant 
did take over the custody of said child in the n1onth of 
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February, 1946; that ever since said time said child 
has been in his care, custody, and control; and that he 
had supported and cared for said child at his own sole 
cost and expense, and alleged that the respondent had 
never at any time since said agreement made any request 
or demand of any kind for alimony under the terms of 
said Decree, and that by reason of all of the facts and 
circumstances, respondent was estopped from asserting 
any right under the terms of said Decree of Divorce to 
recover a judgment against the appellant for any alimony 
accrued under the terms of the Decree. 
In Paragraph 6 of his Answer, appellant also sets 
forth that because of the circumstances aforesaid, the 
respondent had been guilty of laches in asserting any 
right or demand for alimony in a court of equity, and 
that by reason of said laches and because of the agree-
ment between the parties, her claim to relief was barred. 
By Paragraph 7 the appellant further alleged that the 
respondent was regularly employed and was able to sup-
port and maintain herself and liad been able to support 
and maintain herself ever since 1946 and had in fact 
supported herself without assistance from the appeHant 
and requested ~- modification of the Decree so as to 
relieve appellant of payment of alimony under the tern1s 
of the Decree. That said Decree: be further modified so 
as to give to the appellant the exclusive. ~are, custody, 
and control of the minor child subject to reasonable 
visitation by the respondent (T-9-13). 
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The respondent filed a reply \Vherein she ad1nitted 
that she did v·oluntarily surrender the care of said child 
to the appellant and claiming that she. did so because 
she was not so situated as to support or care for said 
child, but desired to have said child returned to her when 
she "\vas able to provide for and care for said child. She 
further admits that the appellant had cared·for and sup-
ported said child since February, 1946; that she agreed 
with the appellant that said child should be supported 
and cared for by the appellant until she could properly 
find a place to care for said child, "and that the defend-
ant agreed with plaintiff that she could take said child 
as a dependent for the purpose of her income tax and 
he has viola ted this agreen1en t." ( T -14-15). 
The evidence in support of the above issues shows 
in substance that when the appellant took over the cu~­
tody of the child, Bruce Stuber, he was then 14 months 
of age. At the ti1ne of the hearing of this cause on May 
14:, 1951, he was 7 years of age ( T -20). 
At the ti1ne the appellant took the child, Mrs. Stuber 
was living with a girl friend and felt that she vv-as unable 
to take proper care of the child; that she did not have 
enough money to take care of him herself; but testified 
that it was her understanding that she could get him back 
('r-21); that ~fr. Stuber told her he would not pay her 
any 1noney for the child nor for herself. She also testified 
that they talked about who would claim Bruce as a 
dependent; that she said she would; and that Mr. Stuber 
ag-reed to this (T.-:22). l\!rs. Stuber ·was not in a position 
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to support the child until the present time; that she 
had now made arrangements with her mother who had 
agreed to take care of Bruce until she could remarry. 
That while Bruce was with his father, she visited hi1n 
as often as she felt like it, as often as she wanted to near-
ly; that when she went to get Bruce, that she was not 
invited into the home, and had had the door slammed in 
her face (T-23). That respondent and Bruce get along 
very well, and that he seems to enjoy being with her. 
Mr. Stuber and his wife have never refused to let her 
see Bruce; that she had not had any trouble about seeing 
him, but they were nasty a few times about it. Since 
the appellant took Bruce into his custody and control, 
he had not paid any money under the Decree of Divorce 
for alimony; that she had been taking the child as a 
dependent, even though he was being supported by his 
father (T-24). She had claimed Bruce as a dependent 
ever since she had been working, and that she had been 
working most of the time since her divorce. The govern-
ment had asked for payment from her for three years 
back and told her she could not claim him as a dependent 
because Mr. Stuber was supporting him. She had asked 
Mr. Stuber for the return of Bruce and he had refused 
( T -25). She further testified after the divorce was grant-
ed, she and Mr. Stuber lived together for a short time, 
but did not get along well, so they separated; that the 
agreement with Mr. Stuber about Bruce and his support 
was had about two months after the separation. At that 
time, she knew that Bruce would be taken care of by 
Mr. Stuber's mothe:r and supported by Mr. Stuber. Mrs. 
Stuber took good care of him. 
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Q. N o,Y, as I understand your testimony, Mrs. 
Stuber, ""rhen you agreed that Mr. Stuber 
would take the child, you agreed that he 
should take tl1e child, and that you would 
release him fron1 any support money for the 
child and release him from the payment of 
alimonyo? 
..;..\.. I told hiin that if Bruce were well taken care 
of there wouldn't be any trouble (T-27). 
Concerning· the care of Bruce after ~fr. Stuber re-
married, the respondent testified that he was well taken 
care of, but she still didn't think they gave him the love 
and affection he needs ; that on some occasions when she 
called for hin1, he was not as clean as she would have 
liked to see him, and that he seems to be somewhat thin 
and nervous. That when she would get him, he didn't 
know just who to 1nind. That he is quite emotional and 
runs around constantly, and that he doesn't like school. 
"He doesn't have any interest in anything, as far as I 
can understand, just what he has told me." (T-28). 
That respondent did not see Bruce for the first two 
years after Mr. Stuber took hirn (T-29); she felt like if 
Bruce \Vas going to stay with his father, that she couldn't 
see any .outlet· as to how she would be able to take care 
of him. She felt like it was for his own good that he have 
very fe\v people to interfere, and that it would be better 
if he \vas living there like he was ; that she had seen._ 
him about twice a n1onth following said two year period. 
\Vhen she goes to see him, she picks him up in a car and 
takes hirn 'vi th her ( T -30). 
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Q. What is it you object to because we want to 
make it pleasant for you when you go to see 
the child~ 
A. Well, I don't see why I have to stand outside; 
not that I really care to go in, that isn't the 
point, but at least people can treat you civil 
when you go to get your own child. 
Q. Well, you mean they didn't invite you in the 
house,~ 
A. No, they never have since I and Harvey have 
been divorced. 
On one occasion, she called to get Bruce and Mr. 
Stuber raised a .commotion. Bruce cried to go with me. 
Mr. Stuber wouldn't let him go at first, but then he 
called me up and said that Bruce could go. That was 
about a month ago (T-31). 
Q. Is that the only time anything of that kind 
has occurred, like that~ 
A. He has been fairly decent to me. I never 
made any claim for any money. I never made 
any claim for any money against Mr. Stuber 
until the Collector of Internal Revenue made 
a claim against me. I never bothered him. 
That was .about December 27, 1950. At that 
time I wa.s very upset about Bruce. 
When we talked about Mr. Stuber taking Bruce, I 
didn't say he should be released. We talked about nry 
taking Bruce as a dependent. I was employed· at the 
time at the Le-rner Shops (T-33). I didn't talk to Mr. 
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Stuber about taking Bruce as a dependent until I had 
notice from the Office of the Collector of Internal Rev-
enue. While Bruce "~as 'vith ~lr. Stuber's Inothe.r, he 
told me he 'vas paying her $65.00 per month. I expect 
to get married. I am acquainted 'vith Mr. Fred E. Bacon 
(T-31). He is a mru:ried man living in Salt Lake and 
I have been going out with him for quite a while. He 
has divorce proceedings pending. I don't know if it is 
in court or not, but it is in the proceedings to be in court. 
l\Ir. Bacon, 'Nhom I- contemplate marrying, has been 
separated from his wife almost two years. 
Q. I 'vill ask you if it is not a fact, Mrs. Stuber, 
that for a period of appro~imately a year, 
you \vere living at No. 234 North Main Street 
in Salt Lake City, and 'vas registered there 
during all of that period as ~1r. and 1\Irs. 
F'red Bacon ~ 
~\. That's right ( T -84). 
I never did request Mr. Stuber to make any payment 
of ali1nony to me or support money until this question 
arose with the Collector of Internal Revenue (T-35). Mr. 
Stuber, his 'vife, and mother are 'vorkirig, and during 
the past year Bruce has so1netimes been taken care of 
hy a baby tender. 
I talked to Bruce's school teacher and he \Vasn't in 
school for almost a n1onth and he was absent an awful 
lot. They took hin1 deer hunting. The teacher said he 
was not very intelligent, but no one took sufficient inte-rest 
in him to help him with his reading (T-38). The teacher 
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said that he was sometimes truant from school and Bruce 
says he does not like school. During the period, I didn't 
see him for two years, it seemed like he has too many 
bosses, and I thought it was for his own good that I 
didn't interfere. My mother lives at 1538 West 8th South 
Stre·et, and has a good home and is able to take care of 
Bruce (T-39). I do not live with my mother. I haven't 
lived with he-r since I was married to Mr. Stuber. If 
I obtain the custody of Bruce·, I would have him live 
with my mother and she would care for him. I don't 
expect to live with my mother unless some arrangement 
can be made whe-re I can, but it is not a very big home. 
We will ha:ve to work that out when the time comes. She 
has two bedrooms and a living roon1, five rooms all 
together. There are my mother and father, a sister, and 
a brother, all living in mother's home (T-40). 
I work at the Blue Cross Insurance Con1pany and 
earn $130.00 per month afte-r deductions. I have been 
working at different jobs for four or five years (T-41). · 
Mrs. Ethel Kalian, the 1nothe-r of respondent, testi-
fied that she would be able to take care of Bruce tein-
porarily; that Bruce: had been at her hon1e on different 
occasions, and she and Bruce get along well together 
(T-43). I get along well with my daughter. I a1n 48 
years of age and was quite ill a few years ago, but feel 
better now. I have neve·r had any trouble when I went 
to get Bruce, and appellant and his wife have always 
been friendly to me. They would let us keep him a couple 
of days if we wanted to (T-45). I know the appellant's 
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Inother is al\vays yery n1uch interested in Bruce and gives 
hun a great deal of love and affection. We never had 
any trouble about it. The appellant's wife has always 
treated n1e "cith proper consideration (T-46). We had 
some little difficulty only on one occasion (T-47). 
The appellant testified in substance that he is em-
ployed by the l~nion Pacific Railroad where he has steady 
work as a brakeman and earns a good salary of about 
$400.00 a month before deductions (T-49) . 
. Appellant testified that when he took the custody of 
/ 
Bruce, that the respondent was living with a girl friend; 
that she was having trouble with heT mother and did 
not want her 1nother to have the custody of Bruce (T-51). 
I \vas up to see the baby one day and it was ill and it 
\vas agreed that I should take the. baby, and that if I did 
take it, that I would not pay her any more support money 
or alin1ony. It was agreed at that thne that my mother 
\Vould take care of Bruce because I had to work each day 
and w·as living at hon1e with my mother. I took the cus--
tody of the baby at that time. He was then two years 
old and he is now 7 years old and I have had him during 
this "Thole five year period (T-52). I paid my mother 
$60.00 a month for his care and paid all of the bills, such 
as phone, lights, gas, and groceries. We have a six roon1 
house (T-53). 
vV e have never had any trouble with Bruce or with 
one another. ~fy present wife and 1nother are very much 
interested in his welfare. They are both very kind and 
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affectionate toward him (T-55). My wife and I agree 
very well in connection with his discipline. My mother 
is 54 years old; I am 33 years old; and my present wife 
·is 27 years old. We have one child besides Bruce., who 
was two years old in February, 1951. The children get 
along well together and think a great deal of one another. 
Most of his marks in school are satisfactory ( T -56). His 
last report card showed eight satisfactory marks and 
three unsatisfactory. These related to loud talk in school 
and one was in reading. I am sure that he is a normal 
child in every way, and that any difficulty he has had 
in school is not in any way connected with his home life. 
He reads very satisfactory now for a begin~er. I and 
Mrs. Stuber work with him in his school 'vork. His 
teachers have ne·ver complained to us that his 'vork "\vas 
not satisfactory ( T -57). There is a great deal of affec-
tion between myself and Bruce and I want it to continue 
that way. We have never had any trouble with respond-
ent about seeing Bruce, except on one occasion 'vhen we 
both wanted him at Easter time when we 'vere going up 
the canyon (T-58). 
We have had no difficulties in the re·spondent's visits 
with Bruce. We have had no animosity against her and 
very often inconvenience ourselves to accommodate· her. 
We want him to know his mother and have a nor1nal 
relationship with her as far as possible (T-59). When 
I had my conversation with respondent when sp.e wanted 
me to take Bruce, there was nothing said about her tak-
ing him as a dependent. I did not know that ~he had been 
taking him as a dependent until she called me the day 
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before Christmas of 1950. Following that tin1e, I received 
a letter from her attorney. lT p to that time, she had 
never asked for any alin1ony payments (T-60). I have 
never slammed the door in the respondent's face when 
she crune for Bruce. I do not know what she means about 
somebody being nasty about it. I feel very sure that 
Bruce will be better off remaining with me and my 
present wife and mother, a least until the respondent 
shows more stability in her mode of life (T-61). Except 
for eolds, there 'vas only two oecasions when Bruce was 
away from school. Once he was on the grounds and came 
home instead of going to school, and on another occasion, 
he was with me deer hunting for two days (T-63). At 
the present time, I am working, my wife works, and my 
Inother works, and we have a baby tender part of the 
time (T-64). I have helped Bruce with his reading, and 
he seems to be a fair dra,ver, and he likes to have us read 
to him. I went to school with hi1n when he registered 
(T-66). I talked to the teacher about the occasion he was 
truant. It vvould be like losing my right arm to have 
Bruce taken by respondent. He has never been a"\vay 
from me from the time he was born (T-67). We have 
thre·e ample bedrooms in our home and all toilet and 
lavatory facilities (T-68). 
1\frs. S.ylvia Stuber, appellant's wife, testified that 
she and l\Ir. Stuber were married on October 15, 1947, 
and that they live in the ho1ne of Mr. Stuber's mother. 
They 1noved in 'vith Mr. Stuber's mother in July, 1948 
(T-69-70). Bruce has been with us ever since and _was 
with us before that part of the ti1ne and the rest of the 
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time with Mr. Stuber's mother. We have one other child, 
Stephen, who is two years of age, and he and Bruce have 
sort of grown up together. They are very close to one 
another and Bruce is very protective of Stephen. I think 
a great deal of Bruce and I know he does of me (T-71). 
I have taken care of him when he has been ill and watched 
and worked ·for him as if he were my own. Since we have 
lived with Mr. Stuber's mother, she has left his care 
with me and has not interfered in any way. We all get 
along very fine together (T-72). I work for the Grey-
hound Bus and make $90.00 each t'vo weeks before de-
ductions. They take about $25.00 a month for incon1e tax, 
$4.00 a month for hospitalization, $6.00 for union dues· 
and $2.00 for insurance and Social Security. When I 
have a baby tender, I pay her between $50.00 and $60.00 
per month (T-73). The only reason I work is hecau:-;r 
Mr. Stuber does not make sufficient to get ahead and -vve 
have wante·d to get a h~·me in the country with a little 
acreage. All of l\1:r. Stuber's earnings have been devoted 
to the support of the two children and ourselves ( T -7 J). 
When we have a baby tender, she comes before I leave 
in the morning, and I am home at 4 :30. I am acquainted 
with the respondent (T-75). She usually calls by tele-
phone before she takes Bruce. She· stops and honks and 
I usually have him ready to go with her. There have 
been no unpleasant incidents between respondent and 
mys.elf, and I try to accommodate myself to her con-
venience. I have never slammed the. door in her face. 
Her mother has sometimes called for Bruce and ha.s kept 
him a day or so, and we have never had any difficulty 
about it (T-77). We have never had any conflict about 
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visitation except one day 'vhen I had planned a birthday 
party for hiin (T-78). 
I have had Bruce to son1e of the best doctors in town 
and they say his health is excellent. He has had a number 
of colds (T-79). Some of my earnings I have paid for a 
tonsil operation for Bruce and I have bought clothing 
for him and Stephen and 1nade a down-payment on an 
automobile (T-80). I also bought a refr~gerator. After 
deductions from ~Ir. Stuber's pay check, it isn't more 
than $350.00 a n1onth, and from that he has to pay out 
about $80.00 to $90.00 a month for his road expenses. · 
Our grocery bill an1ounts to about $130.00 per month. 
I love Bruce as much as I do my own child (T-81). l\fr. 
Stuber's mother is home on Saturdays and Sundays, and 
I am home mostly Thursdays and Fridays (T-82). 
The court rendered its decision in this cause (T-88-
90), its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (T-91-
94), and its Judgment (T-95-96). By the judgment, the 
court required that the appellant surrender the. child, 
Bruce Stuber, to the respondent, and that defendant's 
Petition for Modification of the Decree be denied; that 
respondent have judgn1ent against the appellant for the 
sum of $220.00 on account of respondent's income tax 
deficiency and for any other deficiency that n1ight arise 
by reason of the respondent clain1ing the child, Bruce 
Stuber, as a dependent; that the appellant be released 
and discharged from any other obligation to the respond-
ent; that in all other respeets the Decree of Divorce 
remain in force and effect, and that respondent be grant-
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ed judgment against the appellant for $100.00 attorney's 
fees. 
A motion for the amendment of the Findings \Vas 
made (T-98-100) and the same denied on October 6, 1951 
(T-101). The Notice of Appeal was filed on October 9, 
1951 (T-102), and an order extending time to file the 
record on appeal to and including December 3, 1951, was 
made on No:vember 19, 1951 (T-104). The Designation of 
Record on Appeal wa.s filed October 18, 1951 (T-105-106). 
STATEMENT OF· POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE CO,URT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT 
AWARDING THE CARE, CUSTODY, AND CONTROL OF 
THE MINOR CHILD, BRUCE STUBER, TO THE RESPOND-
ENT AND ERRED IN FAILING TO MODIFY THE DECREE 
OF DIVORCE SO AS TO AWARD THE CARE, CUSTODY, 
AND CONTROL OF THE MINOR CHILD TO THE APPEL-
LANT, SUBJECT TO REASONABLE VISITATION BY THE 
RESPONDENT. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST THE 
APPELLANT FOR THE SUl\f OF $220.00, BEING THE 
AMOUNT FOR WHICH RESPONDENT WAS AT SAID TilVIE 
INDEBTED TO THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REV-
ENUE ARISING OUT OF THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT 
FOR A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS CLAIMED THE MINOR 
CHILD, BRUCE STUBER, AS A DEPENDENT IN HER 
INCOME TAX RETURN AND ALSO ERRED IN REQUIRING 
THE APPELLANT TO PAY ANY OTHER SUM OR SUMS 
FOR WHICH THE RESPONDENT MIGHT BECOME OBLI-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
GATED TO PAY THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REV-
ENUE BY REASON OF RESPONDENT CLAIMING SAID 
CHILD AS A DEPENDENT. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDG-
l\IENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANT AND AGAINST 
THE RESPONDENT MODIFYING THE DECREE OF 
DIVORCE SO AS TO RELIEVE THE APPELLANT FROM 
THE PAYMENT OF FUTURE ALIMONY TO RESPONDENT. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE RESPOND-
ENT ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE SUM OF $100.00. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT 
AWARDING THE CARE, CUSTODY, AND CONTROL OF 
TI-IE lVIINOR CHILD, BRUCE STUBER, TO THE RESPOND-
ENT A!{D ERR;ED I}~ FAILING TO MODIFY THE DECREE 
OF DIVORCE SO i\S TO AWARD THE CARE, CUSTODY, 
AND CONTROL OF THE MINOR CHILD TO THE APPEL-
LANT, SUBJECT TO REASONABLE VISITATION BY THE 
RESPONDENT. 
The testimony in this cause established vvithout con-' 
fiict that the minor child of plaintiff and defendant, 
Bruce Stuber, has been in the care, custody, and control 
of appellant, his father, from the ti1ne that said child 
vvas 14 months of age. He is now seven years of age~ 
Plaintiff and defendant each testified that respondent 
requested appellant to take over the custody of this 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
child at which time it was agreed that if the appellant 
would assume the obligation of the child's care and sup-
port, that respondent would make no claim against appel-
lant for the alimony which had been awarded by the 
D·ecree of Divorce, made and .entered on March 29, 1945. 
The appellant, relying upon this agreement, has ever 
since the month of February, 1946, sincerely devoted 
himself to · the general welfare of this child, has given 
it support and supplied its every need and by his own 
efforts 'and the efforts of his mother and present wife 
have given to said child all of the comforts of a ho1ne, 
and bestowed upon him their love, care, and affection 
and are now deeply attached to said child and ate greatly 
.concerned about his future welfare. The respondent; 
herself, was una,ble to disclose any \vant of care and 
consideration for the child. In contrast to sueh loiVe and 
devotion, the respondent for a period of t\vo years, 
wholly failed to show any interest whatever in the \vel-
fare of this child and even failed to see or visit it. The 
attitude of the mother toward the child during thi:~ 
period is sought to be justified by the explanation that 
she felt the child would be better off if she did not inter-
fere with the custody of appellant or the appellant's 
mother who took care of said child 'vhen the appellant 
was at work. It se.ems reasonable to say that the period 
of time when this child had the greatest need of its 
mother has now pas~ed and the child having now attained 
the age of 7 ye,ars, the respondent for the first time seeks 
to recover its custody and control. It would also seern 
to be a reasonable conclusion that she now seek custody 
and contro1 for her own pleasure and ·benefit and not 
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for the general welfare of said child. The evidence dis-
closes "\Yithout anY substantial conflict that since the 
., 
Inother has taken sufficient interest in the child to see 
and visit said child, that there has been the greatest 
cooperation on the part of the father and his present 
'vife to make that association pleasant and agreeable. 
Since January, 1950, the mother has visited said child 
on an average of ap·proxin1ately once a month. Since 
the mother concluded to see and visit with the child, she 
has been caused no difficulty nor inconvenience in so 
doing, except on two occasions. On one of these. occa-
sions, the appellant's wife had arranged a birthday 
party for·the child and on the other occasion the app·el-
lant had arranged an Easter trip for the family. The 
respondent's mother testified that she had never had 
any trouble when she \Vent to get Bruce, and that appel-
lant and his ·wife had al,vays been friendly to her. Any 
slight disturbances v;hich might have occurred when the 
respondent has taken the child are of immaterial con-
sequence. It seems to appellant that the respondent 
has "\vholly failed to show such interest in the child as 
should per1nit her at this time to disturb the very satis-
factory relationship \vhich has existed between the child 
and those charged with its care and maintenance, and 
has wholly failed to show that the \velfare of the child 
will be best or better served by having its custody award-
ed to her. If "\Ve disregard entirely the lack of interest 
shown in the child by the mother for two years of its 
early life, it will still be reflected by the evidence that 
the respondent's mode of life is not sufficiently stabilized 
n.s to show any permanent ability on her part to give 
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to the child the surroundings and care that it will require 
in the future. Respondent testified that she has not 
lived at her mother's home since she was married to 
Mr. Stuber; that if she were to obtain the custody of 
Bruce, she would have him live with her mother who 
would care for him, and that Respondent does not intend 
to live with her mother where said child would be unless 
some arrangement could be rnade which was not appar-
ent at the time of trial. In other words, it would seen1 
that the proceedings brought by the respondent \Vere 
primarily conducted for the purpose of securing the 
custody and control of the child for the respondent's 
mother. There is nothing to appear in the record from 
which any reasonable inference can be made that the 
relationship between mother and child, if a-\varded to 
respondent, would be any different than the relationship 
which has existed during the period of time that thr 
respondent has taken sufficient interest in the child t? · 
see it on occasions. The further facts appear \vithout 
dispute that the respondent expects some tin1e to marry. 
This expectation, however, is based upon the present 
association of the respondent with a married man, and 
that respondent and s~id married man were registered 
at 234 North Main Street, S.alt Lake City, Utah for a 
period of app-roximately one year as Mr. and Mrs. }~red 
Bacon. She has indicated by her testimony that she 
expects ~o marry this man, but certainly the welfare of 
this child should not be predicated up~n the possibility 
that such a marriage may take place in the future, and 
it would be of the opinion of the 'vriters of this brief, 
. under all of the circumstances, that such a marriage is 
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highly improbable and if it \Yere to take place, it is diffi-
cult to 8ee how the best intere8t of this child could be 
served by taking it a\Yay fron1 its father, with whom 
it has been living all these years, and to place it more 
or less under the direction and control of some man 
with whom said child has had no association and is prob-
ably \\~holly unacquainted. 
As \Ye understood the law in this jurisdiction, it 
has now been definitely decided that in dete-rmining 
the right of custody of minor children that such deter-
mination will be made solely in the interest of the child. 
Our statute, Section 40-3-10, provides that: 
'~In any case of sep·aration of husband and 
wife having- minor childre-n, the n1other shall be 
entitled to the care, control and custody of all 
such children * * * provided further, that if it 
shall be made to appear to a court of compet~nt 
jurisdiction that the mother is an immoral, incom-
petent or otherwise improper person, then the 
court may award the custody of the children to 
the father or n1ake such other order as may be 
just." 
By some cases, this court had construed the above 
statute so as to give a fit mother a.primary right to the 
custody of 1ninor children. Subsequently in the case, 
~llley v. Alley, 72 Utah 196, 269 Pac. 487, in a decision 
\Vritten by the late· Justice Cherry it was held: 
"So far as the superior right of the mother 
under the statute is concerned, we think she has 
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waived and lost it in consequence of her failure 
to assert it on the two previous occasions men-
tioned. And there being no sufficient grounds 
shown or claimed why the welfare of the child 
demands a change of its custody, we find no merit 
in the appeal." 
More re-cently in the case of Sampsell v. Iiolt, ___ _ 
Utah ____ , 202 Pac. 2nd 550, this court construed the fore-
g-oing statute in the· following language: 
"Moreover, it seems unreasonable to attribute 
to the legislature a purpose or intent to give to a 
divorced mother an absolute right to the control 
and custody of a child under ten years of age, 
without regard to the best interest of such child. 
For many centuries, it has been the policy of the 
law in matters of this sort to give controlling 
weight to the considerations of the best interest 
of the child. There is nothing in the· legislative 
history of these se-ctions to indicate that it was 
the intent of the legislature to alter this principle. 
Sec. 40-3-10 must be understood a.s applying only 
to cas·es of separation, and not to cases of divorce. 
* * * 
"Child custody proceedings are equitable in 
the highest degree, and this court has consistently 
held that the· best interest and welfare of the 
minor child is the. controlling factor in every case. 
Walton v. Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P. 2d 97, and 
cases there cited. Such proceedings being equi-
table, we may review the facts as well a.s the la'v 
on appeal." 
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\Ye assun1e therefore "~ithout thP eitation of further 
authority that the sole question to be deter1nined under 
Point I is \Yhether or not the eourt has Prred or has failed 
to exercise a sound discretion in a\Yarding the custody 
of the child, Bruce Stuber, to the Respondent in vie\v 
of all of the facts and circumstances appearing in the 
pleadings and the evidence. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST THE 
APPELLANT FOR THE SUlVI OF $220.00, BEING THE 
AMOUNT FOR WHICI-I RESPONDENT WAS AT SAID TIME 
INDEBTED TO THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REV-
ENUE ARISING OUT OF THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT 
FOR A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS CLAIMED THE MINOR 
CHILD, BRUCE STUBER, AS A DEPENDENT IN HER 
INCOME TAX RETURN AND ALSO ERRED IN REQUIRING 
THE APPELLANT TO PAY ANY OTHER SUM OR SUMS 
FOR V/HICH THE RESPONDENT MIGHT BECOME OBLI-
GATED TO PAY THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REV-
ENUE BY REASON OF RESPONDENT CLAIMING SAID 
CIIILD AS A DEPENDENT. 
The respondent admits that she and the appellant 
had an agreement concerning the care, custody, and con-
trol of the minor child. She testified that this agreement 
'vas had about two months after the separation of herself 
and Mr. Stuber; that at that time she knew that Bruce 
would be taken care of by Mrs. Stuber's mother and sup-
ported by f.Ir. Stuber; that Mr. Stube-r did take good 
care of him, and that she agreed that he. sh~uld take 
Bruce and told Mr. Stuber that if Bruce were well taken 
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care of there would not be any trouble (T-27). When 
she and Mr. Stuber talked about Mr. Stuber taking 
Bruce, she didn't say he would be released,. but talked 
about her taking Bruce as a dependent; that at that time 
she was employed at the Lerner Shops (T-33); that she 
did not thereafter talk to Mr. Stuber about taking Bruce 
as a dependent until she had notice from the Office of 
the Collector of Internal Revenue; that she never at any 
time requested Mr. Stuber to make payment of alimony 
until the question arose about her taking Bruce as a 
dependent ( T -35). 
The record discloses that Mrs. Stuber was en1ployed 
during all of the period from the time of the separation 
of herself and Mr. Stuber. It is apparent that for the 
first two years of her employment she either did not 
take Bruce as a de:pendent or if she did, it did not corne 
to the attention of the Collector of Internal Revenue. 
At all events for the entire period of time since the 
Decree of Divorce and until the Collector ascertained 
that Mrs. Stuber was clailning the child as a de:pendent, 
which would be a period of approxin1ately four years, 
Mrs. Stuber made no claim against the appellant. It 
seems obvious to the writers of this brief that if any 
such agreement existed as testified to by Mrs. Stuber, 
that she would at least have notified Mr. Stuber of the 
time when she commenced taking Bruce as a dependent. 
Mr. Stuber testified that when he took the custody of 
Bruce," respondent was living with a girl friend; that 
she was then having trouble with her mothe·r and did 
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not 'Yant her 1nother to haYe the custody of Bruce~; that 
he 'vas up to see the baby one day and it was ill and it 
,,~as then agreed that he take the baby and that when he 
did take it, he 'Yas not to pay respondent any 1nore sup-
port money or alimony. nlr. Stuber paid his mother 
$60.00 a month for the care of Bruce and p·aid all of the 
home bills and groceries (T-51-53). He did not know 
that )lrs. Stuber "~as taking Bruce as a dependent until 
just before Christmas of 1950; that when he had the 
above conversation with respondent, there was nothing 
said about her taking him as a dependent (T-59-60). 
Considering all of the surrounding facts and circum-
stances, we think it- probable that the testimony of Mr. 
Stuber in regard to the agreement when the custody of 
Bruce was surrende-red to him that nothing would have 
been said concerning who should take Bruce as a de-
pendent. This would be especially true because the re-
spondent was 'vell aware that the entire sup.port of Bruce 
was being provided by the appellant, and that she 
would have no legal right under such circumstances to 
take credit for Bruce as such dependent. We submit 
therefore that the court erred in· finding that such an 
agree1nent was made and in rendering j·tidgment against 
the appellant as set forth in Point II. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDG-
MENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANT AND AGAINST 
THE RESPONDENT MODIFYING THE DECREE OF 
DIVORCE SO AS TO RELIEVE THE APPELLANT FROM 
TI-IE PAYMENT OF FUTURE ALIMONY TO RESPONDENT. 
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Without further discussion of the above point, we 
request the court's consideration there~of under the argu-
ment presented under Point IV and respectfully submit 
that the appellant was entitled under the circumstances 
to be relieved from the payment of alimony in the future 
to the Respondent. 
POIN'l, IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE RESPOND-
ENT ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE SUM OF $100.00. 
The appellant admits that if the respondent "\vas 
entitle~d to an award of attorney's fees that the amount 
required to be paid by the decre·e is not unreasonable, 
but we are of the opinion that in this case the respondent 
was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. The 
evidence disclO.ses, as hereinbefore po~inted out, that this 
pr9~eeding was initiate·d by the respondent for the pur-
pose of recovering the future care, custody, and control 
of the minor child of the parties and for the purpose of 
recovering a judgment for accrued alimony clain1ed in 
the respondent's Affidavit in the amount of $3,550.00. In 
the lower court the re~pondent prevailed as to the custody 
of the minor child, but recoiVered nothing unde·r her clain1 
that there was due and owing $3,550.00 in unpaid ali-
mony. 
On the respondent's claim for unpaid alin1ony, the 
court found in Paragraph No. 6 of the Findings (T-9:3-
93) that because of the agreement entered into by plain-
tiff and defendant plaintiff was entitled to recover frorn 
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the defendant the sun1 or sun1s of n1oney she "'ill be obli-
gated to pay to the Collector of Internal Revenue by 
reason of said Collector disallowing the· plaintiff the 
right to take said minor child as a dependent. The court 
further found that because of said agreement the plain-
tiff had \vaived her right to receive fron1 the defendant 
any amount of alimony pa~""Inents in arrears in excess of 
the amount or amounts she will be compelled to pay the 
Collector of Internal Revenue. It will thus be seen that 
the plaintiff did not prevail on her claim for unpaid 
alimony. lTnder these circumstances it would appear 
that each party should be required to bear his own 
attorney's fees. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence which discloses 
that the respondent was unable to pay her own attorney's 
fees. The record discloses that the respondent was reg-
ularly employed. So far as disclosed by the record, it 
may be a fact that the respondent had ample funds or 
property on hand without re·gard to her earnings to meet 
her own attorney's fees and court costs and the record 
affirmatively shows that at the time her proceedings 
were commenced, she was regularly employed by the 
Blue Cross Insurance Company and earned $130.00 
per month after her deductions; that she had been work-
ing at different jobs for the last four or five yea.rs (T-41). 
The record also discloses that the respondent is more 
able or equally as able as appellant to bear her own 
expenses. Mr .. Stuber earns after deductions between 
$325.00 and $350.00 a month ( T -49). Mrs. Stuber testi:. 
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fied that the pay check of Mr. Stuber is not more than 
$350.00 a month and from that amount, he pays from 
$80.00 to $90.00 a ntonth while he is away on his runs as 
a brakeman for the Union Pacific Railroad. The grocery 
bill each month for the support of the family, including 
app~llant's mother in whose· home appellant and his 
family live, amounts to $130.00 per month. The appellant 
also pays for all of the utilities used in the hoine. He 
is compelled to pay for his hotel room and meals on 
each trip out. In consideration of living with his mother 
in her home, he buys all of the groceries for the family 
including his mother (T-65, 81-82). The record does not· 
show the amount expended for utilities such as telephone, 
electricity, and gas, but would at least reduce the net 
income ·of $130.00 per month to approximately $110.00 a 
month, and if it were not for the inco~me of his wife, 
he would have to p·ay the installments on the purchase of 
his automobile, togethe-r with medical expenses from tin1e 
to time as they arise. 
The app·ellant's wife testified that she works for tl1e 
Greyhound Bus Company and earns $90.00 each two 
weeks before deductions; that she has the following 
deductions: $25.00 per month for incon1e tax, $4.00 per 
month for hospitalization, $6.00 per month for union 
dues, $2.00 for insurance and social security; she further 
testified that at the· tin1e of trial, she was paying the 
sum of $50.00 to $60.00 per month for a baby tender frorn 
the wages she was re-ceiving because appellant's 1nother 
was working; and that the only reason she works is be-
cause Mr. Stuber did not make sufficient to get ahead 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
and they "1"anted to buy a home ( T-73-75). She had also 
paid ~rom her o'vn earnings for a tonsil operation for 
Bruce; had bought hin1 clothing; and n1ade a down-pay-
ment on an auton1obile and bought a refrigerator (T-79-
80). Appellant and his 'vife had contracted obligations 
and laid out plans for the future welfare of themselves 
and their family without any anticipation whatsoever 
that they would be called upon to meet the expense which 
would arise incident to this litigation. So that at the 
time the same was commenced and at the time of trial, 
their obligations and the necessities of their family were 
such that it would seem that the respondent was much 
more able to bear her own expenses than the appellant. 
Furthermore, we submit it is not unreasonable to assume 
that the respondent gets financial assistance from the 
person with whom she has been associating and appar-
ently living with for a considerable period of time. 
In the Affidavit which was filed initiating these pro-
ceedings (T-3), no claim was made that respondent was 
unable to meet her own expenses and attorney's fees. 
Under all of the circumstances, we respectfully submit 
that this is not a case wherein attorney's fees should 
be awarded. In the. case of Weiss vs. Weiss, 111 Utah 
353, 179 Pac. 2nd 1005, this court held: 
"That it is proper for the court to allow attor-
ney's fees in its discretion provided the necessity 
for such awards is found to exist." 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the appellant is entitled 




JOE P. BOSONE 
Atto'f"neys for Appellant 
405 Felt Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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